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Soviet intervention in Afghanistan a big mistake

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Soviet intervention in Afghanistan a big mistake
 38 years ago, on 6th of Jadi 1358 (27 Dec. 1979), the Red Army of the Former Soviet Union, overthrew the then president of Afghanistan Hafizullah Amin by sending more than 100 thousands of soldiers to Afghanistan, exposing the black page of aggression and hegemony in contemporary history of the country. 
With the arrival of Soviet forces, Mujahidin resistance spread across the country and those were the days when a unified nation from south to north fought against the then Soviet Union. But the Mujahidin factions had no idea they were going to fight a brutal civil war after their withdrawal.
In the ten years of resistance more than one million Afghans were killed, over five million fled the country taking refuge in Pakistan, Iran and rest of the world. The then Red Army also sustained over 20000 casualties and multi thousands wounded as well as worth three to four billion US Dollar material damages. The outcomes of Red Army invasion were countless damages not only to Afghan people but also to the then USSR people. 
Right after Soviets withdrawal and collapse of the then communist regime, the Mujahedin could not reach to a common term to form a broad-based government and after that the civil wars started. Four years and half, this war continued between different groups of Mujahedeen for gaining the political power, caused to debilitate the newly established Islamic government and Taliban as a radical Islamic movement emerged. 
Eventually with 9/11 attacks the radical regime of the Taliban collapsed with the ground efforts of resistance front and air support of US and its allies and the new so-called democratic system set up. Today, after 16 years of combat against terrorism in Afghanistan led by the US, still the end of this campaign is uncertain and who knows that this war would continue for more year’s even decades. 
If the differences between the American and Russian experiences are significant, there is at least one major similarity: the role played by Pakistan. Pakistan supported the mujahidin despite the enormous risk involved in provoking the Soviet Union, then the world’s largest military power. Ironically, today Pakistan again acts as the safe haven for insurgents and their logistical supply line. The ISI is again the instrument by which Pakistan maintains its links to the Taliban and other extremist organizations, aiming to make fail US-led coalition and the Afghan government’s war on terror.
If the United States and its allies in Afghanistan demonstrate their resolve, especially with the additional forces to win the battle, the alliance needs to make clear to Islamabad that the Taliban will not succeed on the battlefield.
Pakistan must recognize that the existence threat to its freedoms comes from the jihadists. Only when the key players in Pakistan, both in the political parties and in the army, come to that conclusion will change occur. The United States needs to engage intensively to convince them of this reality.
Since the then Soviet intervention was a big mistake and resulted to devastation of Afghanistan’s infrastructures, the international community and the US must do more to avoid foreign interventions over Afghan affairs, in particular the neighboring countries, so that the Afghan government and people could leave in a sound and fair environment free of any insurgency and bloodshed.
The Afghanistan neighbors had played and still playing key role in domestic affairs of the country, and they are required to be pressured to end their support of certain militants and help bring peace and stability to the war-suffered nation.